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contended that the maxim was applicable to the interest retained by the settlor
in the intangibles now held by the trustee in another state so as to give such
interest a taxable situs at his domicile. In the latter case jurisdiction to tax
the intangibles upon the death of the settlor was expressly denied the state
wherein the trustees were domiciled.
However, the instant case does not lack support in principle and authority.
Numerous are the decisions asserting that legal title is the test of jurisdiction
to tax and allowing the corpus of the trust to be taxed in its entirety by the
state of the trustees' domicile.16 Thus the courts have tacitly admitted the
proposition that the taxable situs of the interests in the corpus that are held
by other than the trustees must be taken to be at the situs of the trust-that is
to say, it follows the situs of the trustees' interest. If this is to be accepted
and retained then of course in view of the unconstitutionality of multiple
taxation, the maxim must be restricted in so far as it would operate to give
the settlor's state jurisdiction to tax.
It should be noted that the peculiar facts of the principal case lend support
to the contention that an actual taxable situs exists at the domicile of the
trustee. In addition to the presence of legal title in a resident of Colorado,
it appeared that the intangibles were kept there, and that the trust had been
created and administered in that state.17 These facts also strengthen materially
the position here taken that the general rule of the application of the fiction
"must yield to the established fact of legal ownership, actual presence, or
control elsewhere, and ought not to be applied if to do so would result in
inescapable and patent injustice whether through double [multiple] taxation
or not."1 8 In short it does not appear unreasonable to contend that the maxim
which was adopted to prevent the escape from taxation should be discarded
when taxation is assured, and that the fictitious situs which is but a substitute
for an actual situs should be cast aside when the property acquires a locality
and is subject to the authority of another state.
In conclusion it might be admitted that the question involved in the principal
case is a close one, and will never be definitely settled until passed upon by the
Supreme Court. However it is believed that in view of the historical
development of the law of taxation, and the trend of judicial opinion as
evidenced by the recent decisions, that the Court will in all probability sustain
the holding of the New York tribunal. C. D. L.
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the plaintiff should have the privilege of visiting without molestation or annoy-
ance her aged mother, living -with the defendant. The plaintiff shortly there-
after obtained an order enjoining defendant from molesting her while visiting
her nother and the defendant appealed. Held, that the plaintiff's natural right
to visit her mother, fortified by a written contract executed for valuable con-
sideration, was a sufficient basis for injunctive relief. 1
Since the now famous case of Gee v. Pritchard2 the majority of our courts
have clung tenaciously to Lord Eldon's dictum that equity has jurisdiction to
protect only property rights.3 Many equity courts have announced adherence
to this doctrine simply because the common law did not recognize and protect
mere personal rights.4 Civil rights statutes and the larger recognition of a
right to damages for mental suffering indicate the growth in recent years of
personal as distinguished from strictly property rights. 5 And there seems to
be no rational principle forbidding the application to recognized. personal
rights of the familiar rule that if the remedy at law is inadequate equity will
give relief.
As a general proposition equity will assume jurisdiction if the law remedy
is inadequate,7 and equitable relief will not be denied on the ground that a
clear legal remedy exists unless the remedy at law is as practical, efficient
and adequate as that afforded by equity.8 Courts of equity are in fact protect-
ing and enforcing personal rights either by widening the concept of property
and finding a nominal property right involved as a technical basis for juris-
diction,9 or by courageously repudiating the old doctrine and asserting juris-
diction of personal as well as property rights.1 0 Though no property right
exists, the noise of a work shop disturbing the rest and sleep of a sick
person, 1 1 the removal of a corpse from a burial lot,1 2 and the use of a rifle
range until it is rendered free from danger to occupants of adjoining prop-
ertyla have been enjoined. Likewise equity has assumed general supervisory
1Reed v. Carter (March 23, 1937), 268 Ky. 1, 103 S. W. (2d) 663, Court of
Appeals of Ky.
2 Gee v. Pritchard (1818), 2 Swans. 402.
aRagland, Jr., The Right of Privacy, 14 Kentucky L. J. 114; Corliss v.
Walker (1894), 57 F. 434, 31 L. R. A. 283; Mead v. Stirling (1892), 62 Conn.
586, 27 A. 591; Bonifaci v. Thompson (1917), 252 F. 878.
4 "Jurisdiction of Equity to Protect Personal Rights", 14 A. L. R. 295.
5 Ibid, p. 295.
6 Chafee, Jr., Extension of Equitable Jurisdiction Beyond Protection of
Property Rights, 34 Harvard L. Rev. 407.
7 McAfee v. Reynolds (1891), 130 Ind. 33, 28 N. E. 423.
8 Indianapolis Northern Traction Co. v. Essington (1913), 54 Ind. App. 286,
99 N. E. 757; Cincinnati B. & C. R. Co. v. Wall (1911), 48 Ind. App. 605, 96
N. E. 389.
9 Grigsby v. Breckinridge (1867), 2 Bush (Ky.) 480, 92 Am. Dec. 509;
Vanderbilt v. Mitchell (1907), 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 103; Munden v. Harris
(1910), 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076; Williams v. O'Shaughnessy (1918),
172 N. Y. S. (Misc.) 574; Stark v. Hamilton (1919), 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861.
10 Supra, Note 3, p. 300.
1 1 Dennis v. Eckhardt (1862), 3 Grant (Pa.) 390.
12 Sherrard v. Henry (1921), 88 W. Va. 315, 106 S. E. 705.
13Killopp v. Taylor (1874), 25 N. J. Eq. 139.
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authority over the persons, as well as the property, of all citizens who are
under any legal disability,14 as infants,1 5 lunatics and idiots.18
Where a personal right is fortified by a contract, equity unquestionably
has jurisdiction to enjoin a breach of the contract where the remedy at
law is clearly inadeluate. Thus the right of a wife to the sole control of
children under a separation contract, 17 the right of a wife to live separate
from her husband free from his molestation or visits as covenanted in a deed
of separation,18 and the right of freedom from the noise of church bells
during agreed hours19 have been enforced by injunction. This exercise of
equitable jurisdiction to restrain a breach of contract is substantially coinci-
dent with its jurisdiction to decree specific performance.2 0
The present decree may involve the Court in difficulties relative to deter-
mining what conduct will constitute molestation and a violation of the injunc-
tion; also it will not of necessity improve the relations between the litigious
sisters. 2 1 Courts have hesitated to take the step of granting an injunction on
the ground of molestation or annoyance alone.2 2 But in addition to molesta-
tion the defendant here has broken a valid contract for which there is no ade-
quate remedy at law. Certainly an equity court has jurisdiction of in its
sound discretion it believes the injunctive remedy to be practical and effec-
tive.2 3
In its dictum the Court indicates that even in the absence of any contract
it would have protected the plaintiff's natural right to visit her mother without
molestation. This is an announcement of cessation from "unintelligent
adherence to the dicta of a great judge in the pioneer case." 24 There is no
valid reason why preventive justice should not extend to protection of personal
rights. The instant opinion is in line with the growing tendency to repudiate
the theoery that equity has jurisdiction to protect and enforce only property
rights, and expressly recognizes that personal rights can be protected ade-
quately only by a court of equity.2 5  J. W. C.
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-Plaintiff, discovering her house on fire, telephoned the fire department. To
reach plaintiff's house, the fire truck had to cross defendant's railroad tracks.
On reaching the tracks the trucks were prevented from continuing by a train
obstructing the crossing. Plaintiff's son informed the engineer that his home
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21 Casenote, 51 Harvard L. Rev. 166.
22 Chappell v. Stewart (1896), 82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542; Ashinsky v. Levenson
(1917), 156 Pa. 14, 100 A. 491.
23 South Side Motor Coach Co. v. McFarland (1934), 207 Ind. 341, 191
N. E. 147.
24 Pound, "Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Person-
ality", 29 Harvard L. Rev. 641.
25 Supra, Note 3, p. 295.
